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Abstract
This paper examines relationships between religion and two forms of homonegativity
across 43 European countries using a bivariate response binary logistic multilevel model.
The model analyzes effects of religious believing, belonging and practice on two response
variables: a) a moral rejection of homosexuality as a practice and b) intolerance toward
homosexuals as a group. The findings indicate that both forms of homonegativity are preva-
lent in Europe. Traditional doctrinal religious believing (belief in a personal God) is positively
related to a moral rejection of homosexuality but to a much lesser extent associated with
intolerance toward homosexuals as a group. Members of religious denominations are more
likely than non-members to reject homosexuality as morally wrong and to reject homosexu-
als as neighbors. The analysis found significant differences between denominations that
are likely context-dependent. Attendance at religious services is positively related to homo-
negativity in a majority of countries. The findings vary considerably across countries: Reli-
gion is more strongly related to homonegativity in Western than in Eastern Europe. In the
post-soviet countries homonegativity appears to be largely a secular phenomenon. National
contexts of high religiosity, high perceived government corruption, high income inequality
and shortcomings in the implementation of gay rights in the countries’ legislations are statis-
tically related to higher levels of both moralistic homonegativity and intolerance toward
homosexuals as a group.
Introduction
Homosexuality has long been subject to religiously infused debate across Europe. In many
Eastern European countries homosexuals face blatant persecution, as the recent criminalization
of homosexuality and repeated homonegative riots in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine demon-
strate. The violent anti-gay protests that followed nearly every gay pride parade that has taken
place in an Eastern European country since the early 2000s [1–4] show that intolerance toward
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homosexuals is widespread in most of Eastern Europe. Although some significant progress
regarding the legalization of same-sex partnerships and marriage has been made in countries
like Estonia, and Slovenia, where the parliament has only recently voted for the legalization of
gay-marriage [5,6], public attitudes may not always reflect these changes.
In Western Europe, too, gays and lesbians are still far from being universally accepted,
despite some positive signals like the recent Irish referendum on gay marriage equality, The
ongoing struggles of Western Europe’s mainline churches and several Christian-conservative
political parties over the legitimacy of gay marriage and the recent anti-gay marriage protests
in London, Dublin, Belfast and Paris [7,8] make clear that in Western Europe, too, homosexu-
als still struggle for their acceptance.
Negative attitudes toward homosexuals have been operationalized in different ways in the
literature. Early psychological studies used the term “homophobia” [9–11], but its use has been
criticized for interpreting such attitudes as (medical) phobias and for obscuring the implicit
discrimination against homosexuals [11,12]. This article follows a more recent convention and
operationalizes negative attitudes toward homosexuality and homosexuals as homonegativity
[12,13]. This article distinguishes between two forms of homonegativity: moralistic homonega-
tivity refers to attitudes toward homosexuality as a behavior, while intolerance toward homo-
sexuals as a group is a personal rejection of homosexuals based on out-group prejudice [14–
17]. Only a few empirical studies so far have made this distinction [18–20]. Yet, distinguishing
between the two forms is important, as they are very different attitudes.
When discussing homonegativity, the influence of religion is an important factor. On anti-
gay marches throughout Europe, displays of Christian symbols and references to religious sex-
ual morals could be seen frequently [3,8]. It is common knowledge that the doctrines of the
three Abrahamic religions contain passages condemning homosexuality as a sin [19,21–23] It
is therefore no surprise that religiosity and church membership have been found to be posi-
tively related to homonegativity [24–26]. It should be noted that the teachings of Christianity
and Islam also contain passages that remind the believer to ‘hate the sin but forgive the sinner’
[19,27] and to love their neighbors [28]. It is therefore plausible that religiosity could be posi-
tively related to a moral rejection of homosexual practice, but at the same time be unrelated to
intolerance toward homosexuals as a group. Since the classics of sociology [29], religion has
been found to be a main supplier of moral values, thus ensuring social cohesion. Others have
emphasized the role of religion as a supplier of collective identities [15,30,31]. These different
functions of religion may be differently related to the two forms of homonegativity. More
importantly, religion is a multidimensional phenomenon consisting of a believing-, a belong-
ing-, and a practice dimension [32–34]. The three dimensions of religiosity could be differently
related to homonegativity. The literature on religion and homonegativity is large and goes back
to the 1960s [14,35,36]. Although multidimensional concepts of religion have been around
since then [32,37]they have rarely been applied to the study of relationships between religion
and homonegativity. The majority of the literature found positive links between homonegativ-
ity and various measures of religiosity, such as attendance at religious services and self-rated
religiosity [26,36–41]. Religiosity is often operationalized via composite scales without paying
much attention to its multi-dimensionality.
The believing dimension consists of traditional doctrinal beliefs, non-traditional beliefs and
fundamentalism. A number of authors found traditional believers to be more homonegative
than non-traditional and non-believers [26,41–43]. While traditional believers stick to the doc-
trines of their church, non-traditional believers tend to be more liberal and individualized [44].
and are thus more accepting of lifestyles that deviate from traditional doctrines. Studies taking
a modernization theory approach have observed processes of liberalization and individualiza-
tion of religious beliefs [43,45] not only within the secular strands of European societies, but
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also within Europe’s churches [44,46,47], which according to them led to a rise in tolerance
toward homosexuals [45]. Individualized believers can thus be expected to be less homonega-
tive with regards to both forms of homonegativity than traditional believers.
Fundamentalism is defined as an absolute and exclusive truth-claim of one religion over
others [48,49] and has repeatedly been found to be a strong predictor of homonegativity
[26,41,42,50,51]. Its exclusivity distinguishes fundamentalism from traditional doctrinal beliefs,
such as beliefs in God and beliefs about religious teachings.
The second dimension of religiosity is belonging. Religious belonging is often operationalized
via denominational affiliation. Studies have shown that members of religious denominations
have less liberal attitudes than non-members and are more likely to endorse homonegative views
[24,52,53]. Hayes found religious affiliation in general to be related to conservatism and intoler-
ance toward homosexuals, but Protestants not to differ significantly from Catholics when other
variables are controlled for [52,54]. Nonetheless, doctrinal differences between denominations
could result in differences in their members’ propensity to tolerate homosexuality and homosex-
uals as a group.
The findings in the literature on denominational effects thus far are inconclusive. Several
American studies found Evangelical Protestants to be more intolerant toward homosexuals
than Mainline Protestants, Catholics and Jews [20,36,39,48,55,56]. For the European context,
Scheepers, Grotenhuis and Slik [53] and Hayes [52] found no significant difference between
Catholics and Protestants, rather, having a religious affiliation per se mattered for tolerance
toward minorities (Ibd.). Likewise, Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello [57] found Catholics to be
no more prejudiced toward immigrants than members of other denominations. A number of
studies [25,43,58,59] found Muslims to be less tolerant of homosexuality than Catholics, Prot-
estants and orthodox Christians. One might thus expect Muslims to be more intolerant toward
homosexuals. However, it is questionable whether Muslims really differ from members of
other denominations, once differences in education and wealth and country-level contexts of
poverty and democratic governance [59] are adjusted for.
Several factors may contribute to why the findings in the literature are not conclusive. The
studies used different surveys and the questions measuring homonegativity differ between sur-
veys. More importantly, the studies looked at different national contexts. The US is a very dif-
ferent context from Europe and even within Europe there is great variation across countries.
More cross-national studies using a multilevel framework that can pick up variations in homo-
negativity across and between countries are needed. The robust pattern found in the literature
on Europe so far is that those with a religious affiliation seem to be more likely to hold homo-
negative views than those without a religious affiliation and that Muslims seem to be less toler-
ant toward homosexuality than members of other denominations.
The third dimension of religiosity is religious practice. The analysis of this paper focuses
on religious practice within a religious community, operationalized via attendance at religious
services. This has two reasons: First, the majority of the literature concentrates on religious
practice in church, mainly using attendance at religious services as a proxy. Using the same
operationalization ensures comparability of the results. Secondly, there is a scarcity of measures
of other forms of religious practice, such as prayer, meditation and pilgrimage in the surveys
available on Europe. The interest of this paper is in active religious practice in the community.
Moral community theory states that being involved in a church and interacting with religious
peers fosters pro-social attitudes and norm-conformity and discourages deviant behavior
[60,61]. According to social capital theory this is due to social network-effects. Individuals who
are actively involved in church are exposed to the religious values and attitudes of their peers
[62].
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In their study of religion in the American context, Purnam and Campbell found active
involvement in religious communities to be linked to pro-social values, but also to intolerance
toward diverging opinions and lifestyles, homonegativiy in particular [62]. One can thus expect
people who actively participate in religious services to be more likely to endorse moralistic
homonegativity. However, because America’s and Europe’s monotheistic religions teach to
‘hate the sin but to love the sinner’ it is plausible to expect involvement in church to be unre-
lated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
Religion exists not only on the individual level, but also creates national contexts that indi-
viduals are exposed to. The moral community hypothesis [60,63,64] emphasizes that on the
macro-level the morals of religious communities spill over to the non-religious population,
influencing the attitudes even of those who are not actively involved a church. Putnam and
Campbell found people living in religious communities to be more likely to be intolerant
toward lifestyles that diverge from the religious morals of the majority [62]. One could thus
hypothesize that populations of highly religious countries show (on average) more moralistic
resentment of homosexual practice.
Other national contexts that were often found to be related to higher levels of homonegativ-
ity of populations are a low GDP [25,59], deficits in the implementation of gay-rights in the
countries’ legal codes [58,65,66,59] and deficits in governance against corruption. Moderniza-
tion theory [45,67,68] emphasizes socio-economic contexts of wealth and security as drivers of
liberalization, especially as regards gender-attitudes. GDP, good governance, and gay-rights
implementation are frequently used measures in this literature. The countries’ levels of gay-
rights implementation vary greatly across Europe and are likely to influence public attitudes
toward lesbians and gays [5,65].
High levels of corruption of countries are highly correlated with a low GDP. Successful anti-
corruption governance was found to be associated with higher tolerance toward various out-
groups [69]. Similar findings have been reported with regards to income inequality. Relative
deprivation theory [69–71] claims that income inequality is related to anti-social attitudes, and
homonegativity. The countries’ levels of perceived corruption, income-inequality and levels of
gay-rights implementation are important control variables because they have been theorized to
influence both individual-level religiosity and public attitudes toward homosexuals [43,71].
According to modernization theory, religion loses its salience as countries modernize, while at
the same time values, such as gender norms and sexual morals become more liberal. Including
these contextual variables helps to ensure that any statistical relationships found between reli-
gion and homonegativity are robust.
At this point we need to acknowledge some limitations of this article. A literature on homo-
nationalism, “pink-washing” and the “European pink agenda” [72–75] contributes insights
into the role of nationalist identity-politics. According to this literature, gay-rights and the
institutional acknowledgment of queer identities have been instrumentalized by European gov-
ernance bodies and national governments to create a notion of a tolerant, gay-friendly Western
Europe vis-à-vis an intolerant rest [75]. Puar [73] and Ammaturo [72] point out that such utili-
zations led to the construction of accepted versus not accepted gay and queer identities that are
intersected with race—non-white gays being more disadvantaged than white EU-nationals. At
the same time in Eastern European countries, such as Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Lithuania and
Latvia, homosexuals have been persecuted, and gay-rights taunted as expressions of a decadent
Western ‘other’ by ultraconservative and religious nationalists [76]. The homonationalism lit-
erature has contributed important insights from an institutional meso-level perspective, but
these theories are difficult to test with survey data. The EVS, although uniquely well-equipped
for cross-national comparisons of social attitudes, does not contain suitable questions to mea-
sure nationalism or perceptions of European Pink Agenda politics. The data does also not
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differentiate attitudes toward different gay identities. These factors are likely to influence
homonegative attitudes in Europe, but cannot sufficiently be operationalized with the survey
data currently available.
This article presents a multilevel analysis of relationships between religion, a moralistic
rejection of homosexuality as a behavior and intolerance toward homosexuals as a group across
43 European countries. The differential effects of each religiosity-dimension on the two forms
of homonegativity are examined using a bivariate response binary logistic multilevel model
[77,78].
Thus, religion effects on both response-variables will be analyzed and compared simulta-
neously. This approach is preferable to modeling each response separately, because it allows for
a direct comparison of the model coefficients, their standard errors and the residual variances
across both responses.
The analysis seeks to answer the following questions: How is religion in Europe related to
the citizens’ attitudes toward homosexuality as a practice and toward homosexuals as a group?
Do the three religiosity-dimensions, believing, belonging and practice differ in their relation-
ships with the two forms of homonegativity? Lastly, how does the national context matter for
the citizen’s likelihood of endorsing homonegative attitudes? Are individuals living in highly
religious countries more likely to express homonegative views than individuals living in
secular countries, when controlling for the countries’ levels of government corruption, income
inequality and deficits in the implementation of gay-rights?
Hypotheses
In accordance with literature on modernization we expect traditional religious believing to be
related to moralistic homonegativity, but unrelated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a
group.
H1: Traditional doctrinal believing in a personal God is positively related to moralistic homo-
negativity, but statistically unrelated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
We hypothesize further that individualized unconventional God-beliefs are negatively
related to both forms of homonegativity.
H2: Belief in a Spirit/Life Force is negatively related to both moralistic homonegativity and
intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
Regarding fundamentalism we follow a large literature finding positive links with various
forms of intolerance including homonegativity targeted at homosexual practice and homosexu-
als as a group:
H3: People who endorse fundamentalist religious truth-claims are more likely than non-fun-
damentalist (traditional and non-traditional) religious believers and non-believers to express
moralistic homonegativity and to be intolerant toward homosexuals as a group.
In agreement with the literature on religious belonging, we hypothesize that membership in
religious denominations is associated with moralistic homonegativity. However, since Chris-
tian and Islamic teachings encourage their members to ‘hate the sin but to forgive the sinner’
[27], it is plausible to expect denominational belonging to be unrelated to intolerance toward
homosexuals as a group.
H4:Members of religious denominations are more likely to express moralistic homonegativity
than the religiously unaffiliated.
Because research on Europe found Muslims on average to be more intolerant toward homo-
sexuality than members of other denominations, we expect that:
H5:Muslims are more likely than members of the other three denominations and non-mem-
bers to express moralistic homonegativity.
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Since none of the other denominations was found to be more homonegative in its teachings
than the others, we do not expect Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and the religiously unaffili-
ated to differ significantly in their likelihood of endorsing moralistic homonegativity.
H6: Denominational belonging is statistically unrelated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a
group. Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims and the religiously unaffiliated do not differ sta-
tistically significantly in their likelihood of rejecting homosexuals as neighbors.
For religious practice, similar relationships can be expected. As mentioned above, we expect
active involvement in church to be related to moralistic homonegativity, but not to intolerance
toward homosexuals as a group. The reasoning behind this is that regular churchgoers tend to
be more exposed to the teachings both of heteronormative sexual morals and neighborly toler-
ance and forgiveness of their church than irregular and non-churchgoers.
H7: Religious Practice (Attendance at Religious Services) is positively related to moralistic
homonegativity, but statistically unrelated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
Regarding religious contexts, we hypothesize that:
H8: People living in highly religious countries (countries with high mean rates of attendance
at religious services) are more likely than people living in secular countries to express moralistic
homonegativity.
Data
Ethics approval for the research of this article was obtained from the University of Manchester,
School of Social Sciences Committee on the Ethics of Research on Human Beings.
The findings are based on a secondary analysis of data from the fourth wave of the European
Values Study (EVS) [79]. The data are fully anonymized, were analyzed anonymously and are
publicly available online from the GESIS Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences data archive,
Cologne, Germany [80].
The EVS is a high-quality academic survey including 47 European countries. The data are
representative samples of each country’s adult populations of 16 years and older and were col-
lected in each country via multi-stage random probability sampling. The net sample size is
1000–1500 respondents per country, except in Northern Cyprus (N = 500 respondents),
Northern Ireland (N = 500 respondents), and Iceland (N = 808 respondents). The data were
gathered in the years 2008 to 2010 via computer assisted face-to-face interviews (CAPI). A list
of the exact fieldwork periods for each country is published on the data supplier’s website [80]
and can also be found in their methods report [81].
To allow for a meaningful cross-national comparison of the two forms of homonegativity,
the analysis includes only countries in which both questions were asked. Four countries were
excluded from the analysis: Italy was dropped, because the data on moralistic homonegativity
(‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’) is not available for Italy. The reason for this is, according
to the data provider (GESIS) [82], a translational problem rendering the Italian data on this
question incompatible with the other countries of the sample (in Italy the question wording
“tenere comportamenti omosessuali” differed in its meaning from the question used in the
other countries.
Furthermore, the residual diagnostics of the multilevel model found that Azerbaijan,
Kosovo and Macedonia are influential outliers. In order to prevent biased estimates due to
these outliers, they were dropped from the analysis. All models were tested for outliers and
influential cases using the individual-level and the countries’ df-betas and cook’s distances. The
analysis is thus based on N = 61, 661respondents living in 43 countries. 6,930 cases had missing
values on one or more variables in the models. Cases with missing values were deleted listwise.
All variables that were included in the model were tested for multicollinearity.
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Operationalization
Response Variables. Moralistic homonegativity [19,20] is measured via the statement
‘homosexuality is never justifiable’. Intolerance toward homosexuals as a group is operationa-
lized via the statement ‘would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’ (binary, 1 = yes, 0 = no).
‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’ is a 10-point scale (10 = homosexuality is never justifiable,
1 = homosexuality is always justifiable) and was re-coded into a binary variable capturing the
strongest disapproval-category (1 = homosexuality is never justifiable) versus the rest. This was
done in order to ensure full comparability of the model coefficients between the two response
variables in the joint bivariate response multilevel model.45% of the respondents fall into the
strongest disapproval-category ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’).
Independent Variables. Five indicators of individual-level religiosity are included in the model:
Religious believing is operationalized via belief in a personal God, belief in a Spirit/Life
Force and fundamentalism. Belief in a personal God is a traditional belief that accords with the
doctrines of the three major monotheistic religions in Europe. Belief in a Spirit/Life Force is a
more fuzzy modernized and individualized belief [83]. Both beliefs in God are categories of a
question on God-beliefs in the European Values Survey (EVS): ‘Which of these statements
comes closest to your beliefs?’–‘there is a personal God’,—‘there is some sort of Spirit or Life
Force’,—‘I don’t know what to think’,—‘I don’t really believe there is any sort of God, Spirit or
Life-Force’. The respondents could only choose one answer. The atheist answer could not be
included because in several countries the number of respondents who chose this answer was
too small for meaningful comparisons: e.g. in Armenia 35 respondents, in Cyprus six, in
Northern Cyprus 20, in Georgia six, in Romania 21, and in Turkey 21 respondents made this
statement. Thus, the atheist statement was collapsed with the agnostic statement ‘I don’t know
what to think’ to form the reference category of the analysis.
Fundamentalist believing is operationalized via the statement ‘there is only one true religion
(binary). The statement ‘there is only one true religion’ is dummy-coded against the reference
category ‘other religions have some basic truths as well’ and ‘all great world religions have
some truths to offer’.
As measures of religious belonging four dummy variables for the respondent’s denominational
affiliation, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox andMuslim are included in the models and unchurched
(having no affiliation) is left out of the models as the reference category. This choice of reference
category avoids the problem of empty cells, as for all denominations except unchurched there are
several countries, in which less than five percent of the population are members. As to other
denominations, the numbers of Jewish (83), Buddhist, Hindu, and other religious minorities are
too small to enable meaningful comparisons. Therefore, members of these denominations were
summarized into a category ‘other denomination’ and included in the models.
Religious practice is measured by the frequency of attendance at religious services (7-point
scale, 1-never, 2-less than once a year, 3-once a year, 4-only on specific holidays, 5-once a month,
6-once a week, 7-more often). This ensures comparability with prior research as church atten-
dance has been a standard measure of religious practice throughout the literature. Moreover,
church attendance is an important indicator of active involvement in a moral community [62].
Country-level religiosity is measured by the aggregated mean rate of attendance at religious
services per country.
Controls. The following controls were included in the model: education (1—tertiary,
2- above primary and below tertiary, 3—primary was left out as the reference category),
whether the respondent has experienced long-term unemployment of three months or more, the
respondent’s sex (male as the reference category), being right wing on a political left-right scale
(1–10) and preference for a strong leader over a democracy (‘a strong leader who does not have to
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bother with parliament and elections would be good for the country’) as a proxy for authoritarian-
ism. These controls were chosen because all of them are known to be strongly related to homone-
gativity. A large literature [43,59,84,85] found that people with low education are more likely to
endorse homonegative attitudes. Positive relationships between homonegativity, self-description
as politically right-wing and authoritarian attitudes are also well-documented [86–90].
Experiences of long-term unemployment were found to be related to heterosexism [91] and
intolerance toward homosexuals and other minorities [59,92]. This has been interpreted as a
response to experiences of personal frustration and low social status.
The following variables were included as contextual-level controls: The countries’ levels of
perceived corruption are operationalized via Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI) [93]. The countries’ levels of income inequality are operationalized via their
Gini-coefficients [94] and the levels of implementation of gay-rights in the countries’ legislations
was operationalized via the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Associa-
tion’s index of [95,5] lesbian- and gay-rights in theWorld. The index used here is a four-point
scale (4—gay marriage is fully recognized, 3—gay-partnership is legally recognized, but not equal
to marriage, 2—gay partnership not legally recognized, 1—gay relationships are illegal) and
reflects the status in the European countries at the time of the EVS-fieldwork (2008).
Table 1 contains the summary statistics of all variables of the analysis.
Analysis
The bivariate response binary logistic multilevel model was run in MLwIN [94] using 2nd order
penalized quasi-likelihood estimation (PQL). This estimation technique is appropriate for
modeling categorical data [96]. Multilevel models are routinely used for data that have a nested
structure [78]. The model presented in this paper operationalizes countries as the level-2-units
and individual respondents as the level-1-units, thus individuals are nested within countries.
The bivariate response model is a variant of the multivariate response multilevel model [97].
Its main advantage over modeling the two response variables (‘homosexuality is never justifi-
able’ and ‘would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’) separately is that it allows for a direct
comparison of relationships with the independent variables between the two responses, while
taking the correlation between them into account. Thus, this method yields more accurate
results than modeling the two responses separately.
The model was run stepwise, first as a Null-model, M1 includes the religious denomina-
tions, M2 includes all individual-level religion variables, M3 includes religion and individual-
level controls and M4, the full model includes all controls and country-level variables. In addi-
tion, the models were also run including each independent variable separately. These addi-
tional models were run to ensure that no effect is hidden away by the controls. They are not
presented here, but are made available as supporting information S1 Dataset.
All model steps were run simultaneously for both responses.
The model has the following form:
log
rij
1 rij
 
¼
Xn
t¼0 t ½Ztij ðb0tjþ
Xi
q
bqtjXqjÞ ð1Þ
Yij ¼ b0z1ijþb}1z1ij þ }b}2z1ij þ }b}3z1ij þ m1j z1ijþ m2jz2ij} ð2Þ
z1ij ¼ 1 if
0Homosexuality is never justifiable0
0 if 0Would not like as Neighbours : Homosexuals0
( )
; z2ij ¼ 1 z1ij ð3Þ
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Varðm1jÞ ¼ s2m1; varðm2jÞ ¼ s2 u2; Covðm1jm2jÞ ¼ sm12 ð4Þ
Results
The cross-country frequencies of the two response variables in Fig 1 show that homonegativity
is a problem in Europe. In half of Europe more than 50% of the population find homosexuality
never justifiable and in approximately a Third of the countries more than 50% say they would
not like homosexuals as their neighbors. Across the whole sample, 47% of the population find
homosexuality never justifiable, 15% chose the two middle categories on the ten-point scale,
and only 14% find homosexuality ‘always justifiable’. 37% of Europeans say they would not like
homosexuals as their neighbors and 28% gave both homonegative answers. Unsurprisingly, the
respondents in most countries are much more reluctant to say they would not like homosexu-
als as neighbors than to say ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’. Thus, personal resentment
toward homosexuals as a group is far less prevalent than a moral rejection of homosexual prac-
tice. In cross-European comparison, the Scandinavian and Western European countries are the
least intolerant and Eastern and South-Eastern European countries the most intolerant on both
indicators.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Analysis.
Binary Variables: N Percent Min Max
‘Homosexuality is never justiﬁable’ 61661 45.1 0 1
‘Would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’ 60798 37.3 0 1
Catholic 61661 28.5 0 1
Protestant 61661 12.5 0 1
Orthodox 61661 23.0 0 1
Muslim 61661 08.2 0 1
Other Denomination 61661 02.1 0 1
Belief: Personal God 60935 40.6 0 1
Belief: Spirit/Life Force 60935 32.9 0 1
Belief: Don’t know what to believe 61661 15.6 0 1
Belief: Fundamentalism 60609 22.6 0 1
Sex: female 61649 56.2 0 1
Education: tertiary 61130 23.3 0 1
Education: below tertiary, above primary 61130 57.4 0 1
Long-term unemployment 61661 24.0 0 1
Right-Wing 57074 14.8 0 1
‘Strong leader’ 60795 34.6 0 1
Continuous Variables: N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Church Attendance 60970 3.349 1.940 1 7
Country-Mean Church Attendance 61661 3.349 0.848 1.83 5.67
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)1 61661 5.623 2.153 2 9.30
Gini-Coefﬁcient2 61661 31.875 4.622 24.70 43.20
Gay-rights Index3 61661 1.705 0.840 0 4
1 The original Corruption Perceptions index (CPI) was re-coded, so that high values mean high corruption.
2 High Values mean high inequality.
3 Gay-Rights Index: 1 = homosexual relationships are illegal, 2 = homosexual relationships are not legally sanctioned, but not legalized, 3 = gay-
partnerships are legally recognized, but are not equal to marriage, 4 = gay marriage is fully legally recognized.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t001
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Table 2 contains the percentages of respondents expressing the two homonegative attitudes
across religious categories.
Overall, religiously devout respondents seem more likely to express homonegative attitudes
than the non-religious. Fundamentalists are the most likely to express homonegative attitudes,
followed by traditional believers, non-traditional believers and non-believers. Orthodox and
Muslims are the most prejudiced toward homosexuals and Protestants are the least prejudiced.
However, this could be a Scandinavian effect, as the Scandinavian countries all have Protestant
majorities. The least homonegative group in terms of religious belonging is unaffiliated (no
denomination).
On the practice dimension, people who attend religious services regularly are more likely to
endorse homonegative attitudes than those who do not. Obviously, we cannot make causal
inferences from uncontrolled raw percentages.
In order to test the hypotheses drawn above, we performed a bivariate response multilevel
analysis. Tables 3 and 4 contain the coefficients of the random intercept multilevel model for
the two response variables and Table 5 contains the random part of the joint model. The
Fig 1. Two Indicators of Homonegativity in Cross-National Comparison. Cross-Country-Percentages, Data: EVS 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.g001
Table 2. Percentage of Members of Religious Groups expressing Homonegative Attitudes, Row Percentages.
‘Homosexuality is never justiﬁable’, % ‘Would not like as Neighbors: Homosexuals’, %
Catholic 45.0 30.0
Protestant 26.0 13.0
Muslim 86.0 71.0
Orthodox 77.0 58.0
No Afﬁliation 43.0 30.0
Other Denomination 56.4 33.0
Attends Church once a Month or more often 55.2 45.2
Attend Church less often than once a month 42.7 36.5
Belief: personal God 58.0 48.0
Belief: Spirit/Life Force 39.5 33.0
Belief: Do not know 37.6 34.1
Belief: No Spirit, God or Life Force 29.4 26.0
Belief: Fundamentalism 69.5 57.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t002
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random intercept model fits the coefficients across Europe as a whole, while allowing the inter-
cept to vary across countries. Table 6 contains the random coefficients of each individual-level
religion variable and its main effect. These coefficients are obtained by allowing the slope of
each religion-variable to vary across countries, rather than assuming that they have the same
slope in all countries. Thus, Table 5 gives an overview of the statistical religion effects across
Europe as a whole, while Table 6 indicates whether these effects differ statistically significantly
between countries. To obtain a clear picture of the between-country variation of the two forms
of homonegativity, we first take a look at the Null-model (Tables 2 and 4, M0) and the random
part of the joint model (Table 5).
The Null-model does not include covariates. The intercepts in Tables 3 and 4 (M0) reflect
the average agreement to the two responses, which differs greatly between the two forms of
homonegativity. The between-country variances of the Null-model in Table 5 show that
endorsement of moralistic homonegativity varies more between countries than intolerance
toward homosexuals as a group.
Table 5 contains the between-country variances of the two response variables, the aggre-
gate-level and individual-level correlations between the two responses, the -2-log likelihood
Table 3. Bivariate Binary Logistic Multilevel Model–Response 1: Moralistic Homonegativity.
Response 1: Homosexuality is never justiﬁable’ M0 M1 M2 M3
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Fixed Part
Belief: Personal God 0.175*** 0.042 0.263*** 0.045 0.273*** 0.045
Belief: Spirit/Life Force -0.259*** 0.039 -0.162*** 0.042 -0.151*** 0.042
Belief: Do not know -0.023 0.041 0.018 0.044 0.027 0.044
Belief: Fundamentalism 0.660*** 0.026 0.600*** 0.028 0.603*** 0.029
Catholic 0.129*** 0.038 0.089* 0.039 0.105** 0.039
Protestant 0.106* 0.050 0.088 0.050 0.107** 0.050
Orthodox 0.016 0.043 0.028 0.042 0.029 0.043
Muslim 0.766*** 0.069 0.709*** 0.070 0.707*** 0.069
Other Denomination 0.568*** 0.079 0.577*** 0.080 0.587*** 0.080
Attendance at Religious Services 0.106*** 0.007 0.108*** 0.007 0.108*** 0.007
Education: tertiary -0.808*** 0.035 -0.812*** 0.035
Education: below tertiary, above primary, -0.338*** 0.030 -0.340*** 0.030
Sex: female -0.426*** 0.022 -0.428*** 0.022
Long-term unemployment -0.097*** 0.027 -0.100*** 0.027
Right-Wing 0.307*** 0.030 0.308*** 0.030
Strong Leader 0.176*** 0.023 0.176*** 0.023
Country-Mean Attendance at Religious Services 0.362*** 0.081
Corruption (CPI) 0.338*** 0.069
Gini-Coefﬁcient 0.050*** 0.024
Gay-rights Implementation -0.539*** 0.172
Constant -0.323 0.198 -0.5 0.186 -0.041 0.194 0.023 0.111
* P<0.05
** P<0.01
*** P<0.001
Reference categories of the categorical variables in the model: believing: ‘no God/Spirit/Life Force’ & ‘not stated’, belonging: ‘no afﬁliation’, education:
primary and below primary education, sex: male, right-wing: not being right-wing, strong leader: no strong leader.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t003
Religion and Two Forms of Homophobia in Europe
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538 August 6, 2015 11 / 27
Table 4. Bivariate Binary Logistic Multilevel Model–Response 2: Intolerance toward Homosexuals as a Group.
Response 2: Would not like as Neighbors: Homosexuals’ M0 M1 M2 M3
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Fixed Part
Belief: personal God -0.012 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.001 0.007
Belief: Spirit/Life Force -0.047*** 0.006 -0.032*** 0.007 -0.031*** 0.007
Belief: Do not know 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.007
Belief: Fundamentalism 0.066*** 0.005 0.054*** 0.005 0.054*** 0.005
Catholic 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.011 0.006
Protestant 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008
Orthodox 0.028** 0.008 0.030*** 0.008 0.028*** 0.008
Muslim 0.064*** 0.012 0.054*** 0.012 0.052*** 0.012
Other Denomination -0.006 0.013 -0.006 0.013 -0.005 0.013
Attendance at Religious Services 0.010*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.001
Education: tertiary -0.081*** 0.006 -0.081*** 0.006
Education: above primary, below tertiary -0.037*** 0.005 -0.037*** 0.005
Sex: female -0.051*** 0.004 -0.052*** 0.004
Long-term unemployment 0.011* 0.004 0.011* 0.004
Right-Wing 0.042*** 0.005 0.042*** 0.005
Strong Leader 0.028*** 0.004 0.028*** 0.004
Country-Mean Attendance at Religious Services 0.027* 0.012
Corruption (CPI) 0.058*** 0.011
Gini-Coefﬁcient 0.012** 0.004
Gay-rights Implementation -0.078** 0.028
Constant 0.354 0.036 0.345 0.034 0.388 0.034 0.400 0.018
* P<0.05
** P<0.01
*** P<0.001
Reference categories of the categorical variables in the model: believing: ‘no God/Spirit/Life Force’ & ‘not stated’, belonging: ‘no afﬁliation’, education:
primary and below primary education, sex: male, right-wing: not being right-wing, strong leader: no strong leader.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t004
Table 5. Shared Random Part of the Bivariate Response Multilevel Model.
M0 M1 M2 M3
Random Part Level: Country S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
Sigma-squared v0: Level-2 Variance of response 1 1.678 0.363 1.423 0.308 1.521 0.329 0.425 0.093
Sigma-squared v0: Level-2 Variance of response 2 0.276 0.063 0.229 0.054 0.231 0.054 0.032 0.012
Aggregate Correlation between response 1 and response 2 0.891 0.864 0.858 0.460
Individual-level Corelation between response 1 and response 2 0.234 0.219 0.208 0.208
-2*Log-likelihood 120163 105773 105623
AIC 120185 105805 105664
BIC 120284 105947 105841
Countries 43 43 43 43
N 61661 59653 54731 54731
* P<0.05
** P<0.01
*** P<0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t005
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and the model fit statistics AIC and BIC of the joint bivariate model. Looking at Table 5, we see
that the unexplained level-2 variances of both responses are reduced considerably with the
inclusion of the controls, most strongly with the inclusion of the country-level indicators in
M3. For response 1 (‘homosexuality is never justifiable’) the unexplained between-country var-
iance is reduced from 1.678 in M0 to 0.425 in M4, and for response 2 (‘would not like as neigh-
bors: homosexuals’) the between-country variance reduces from 0.231 to 0.032 between M0
and M3. This tells us that the explanatory variables explain a very satisfactory part of the varia-
tion in homonegativity. The likelihood-ratio tests, AIC and BIC values all indicate a clear and
statistically significant model fit improvement for each step of the model, especially for the
final model (M4).
Regarding the believing dimension, we hypothesized in H1 that traditional doctrinal believ-
ing in a personal God is positively related to moralistic homonegativity, but statistically unre-
lated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a group. We hypothesized further in H2, that
individualized, unconventional God-beliefs are negatively related to both forms of
homonegativity.
The model coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 show that traditional doctrinal belief in a personal
God is indeed positively related to moralistic homonegativity, but is not statistically signifi-
cantly related to intolerance toward homosexuals as a group. Belief in a Spirit/Life Force, on
Table 6. Random Slope Effects of the Individual-Level Religion Measures of the Multilevel Model.
Random Slope Effects of Individual-Level Religion Variables Response 1: 'Homosexuality is
never justiﬁable'
Response 2: 'Would not like as
Neighbors: Homosexuals'
Random Slope Variance S.E. Random Slope Variance S.E.
Believing:
Belief: Personal God, Main Effect 0.223* 0.111 -0.020 0.053
Belief: Personal God, Random Slope 0.480*** 0.107 0.066** 0.020
Belief: Spirit/Life Force, Main Effect -0.206* 0.102 -0.181*** 0.053
Belief: Spirit/Life Force, Random Slope 0.396*** 0.090 0.075** 0.022
Belief: Fundamentalism, Main Effect 0.713*** 0.144 0.326*** 0.082
Belief: Fundamentalism, Random Slope 0.846*** 0.191 0.230*** 0.059
Belonging:
Catholic: Main Effect 0.040 0.076 0.074 0.055
Catholic: Random Slope 0.114** 0.041 0.046* 0.020
Protestant: Main Effect 0.180** 0.088 0.082 0.088
Protestant: Random Slope 0.081 0.043 0.123* 0.054
Orthodox: Main Effect 0.264 0.195 0.310** 0.130
Orthodox: Random Slope 0.814*** 0.267 0.310** 0.116
Muslim: Main Effect 0.814* 0.305 0.300 0.228
Muslim: Random Slope 2.077** 0.705 0.897** 0.358
Practice:
Attendance at Religious Services, Main Effect 0.096*** 0.020 0.055*** 0.011
Attendance at Religious Services, Random Slope 0.015*** 0.004 0.003** 0.001
* P<0.05
** P<0.01
*** P<0.001
Reference categories of the categorical variables in the model: believing: ‘no God/Spirit/Life Force’ & ‘not stated’, belonging: ‘no afﬁliation’, education:
primary and below primary education, sex: male, right-wing: not being right-wing, strong leader: no strong leader.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t006
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the other hand is strongly negatively related to both forms of homonegativity. The findings
thus support H1 and H2. Furthermore, as hypothesized in H3, belief in the fundamentalist reli-
gious truth-claim ‘there is only one true religion’ is strongly positively related to both moralistic
homonegativity and intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
Interestingly, when looking at the random coefficients of religious believing in Table 6, we
see that they all vary significantly between countries. Fig 2 and Fig 3 visualize the pattern of the
variation of the coefficients of belief in a Personal God and Belief in a Spirit/Life Force across
countries for moralistic homonegativity. From Fig 2 and Fig 3 we see clearly that the cross-
country pattern of the coefficients follows a divide between Western Europe versus the post-
communist countries of Eastern- and South-Eastern Europe. The statistical effects of both
beliefs in God and of fundamentalism (not shown here) are consistently stronger and statisti-
cally significant in Western European countries, but much weaker in the East and South-East.
In many Eastern European countries they are not statistically significant at all.
The random coefficient variation shows a very similar, but weaker pattern for the response
‘would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’. Also, fundamentalist believing shows a very similar
cross-country pattern as belief in a Personal God, except for the larger effect sizes (coefficients).
Because of the very similar pattern, maps of the effects of these variables are not supplied here.
Their random coefficients and standard errors are displayed in Table 6.
Regarding the belonging-dimension, we hypothesized in H4 that members of religious
denominations are more likely than people with no affiliation to express moralistic homonega-
tivity. In H5 we hypothesized that Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to express mor-
alistic homonegativity and in H6 we hypothesized that denominational belonging is
statistically unrelated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
Looking at the model coefficients across the two response variables in Tables 3 and 4, we see
clear denominational differences. Members of all religious denominations, Muslims in particu-
lar are more likely than non-members to express one or both homonegative attitudes. The
higher likelihood of Muslims of expressing homonegativity concurs with findings in some of
the literature [25,43]. When holding religious belief and practice constant, Orthodox members
are no more likely than people with no religion to reject homosexuality as morally wrong, but
they are the second most homonegative group when it comes to rejecting homosexuals as
neighbors. Among the Orthodox, it is the more devout members that tend to express a moral
resentment against homosexuality. Members of the other three denominations tend to hold a
moral resentment regardless of their levels of devoutness and belief.
When it comes to rejecting homosexuals as neighbors, thereby expressing a strong social
distance toward them, both Orthodox and Muslims stand out as the most intolerant denomi-
nations independent of their levels of religious practice and belief, while Catholics and Protes-
tants are no more likely than people with no affiliation to reject homosexuals. This difference
between denominations is robust when controlling for religious, political and economic
national contexts.
The random coefficients of denominational belonging in Table 6 show a statistically signifi-
cant between-country variation. This is not surprising, as it is known that denominations are
highly clustered by countries. E.g. 84% of the Orthodox and 59% of the Muslim population in
our sample live in an Eastern European country, another 37% of the Muslims live in Southern
Europe and almost 60% of the Catholics live in South-Eastern Europe. This clustering is
reflected in the results.
We can summarize that H4 and H5 are supported by the data, while H6 is not. The analysis
did find significant differences between denominations and found denominational member-
ship to be statistically positively related not only to moralistic homonegativity, but also intoler-
ance toward homosexuals as a group.
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Concerning religious practice we hypothesized in H7 that attendance at religious services is
positively related to moralistic homonegativity, but statistically unrelated to intolerance toward
homosexuals as a group. Tables 3 and 4 make clear that attendance at religious services is statis-
tically significantly positively related to both forms of homonegativity and the effect holds
when including the controls. H7 is thus only partly confirmed. Religious practice in church is
related not only to a moral rejection of homosexual behavior, but also to strong social distance
toward homosexuals.
Fig 2. The Variation of the Statistical Effect of Belief in a Personal God on Moralistic Homonegativity (‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’). In
Textboxes: the p-value (<0.05) of countries which showed a statistically significant random coefficient; n.a.: question was not asked.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.g002
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As with the other religiosity-measures, we allowed the slope of attendance at religious ser-
vices to vary across countries. The random slope variance for both homonegative responses is
shown in Table 6. In order to make it more visually intuitive, the random slope of attendance
at religious services on moralistic homonegativity was mapped across countries in Fig 4. The
same pattern was also observed for ‘would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’ as the response
(not displayed here).
Fig 4 shows that the coefficients of attendance at religious services follow a West-East-
divide: The relationships with the two homonegative responses are stronger in Western- than
Fig 3. The Variation of the Statistical Effect of Belief in a Spirit/Life Force on Moralistic Homonegativity (‘Homosexuality is never justifiable’). In
Textboxes: the p-value (<0.05) of countries which showed a statistically significant random coefficient; n.a.: question was not asked.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.g003
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in Eastern Europe. In most Eastern European countries the coefficient is not statistically signifi-
cant at all. We thus observe the same pattern for the practice dimension as seen for the believ-
ing dimension of religion. toward homosexuals as a group.
Table 7 contains chi-squared difference tests of each model coefficient across the joint bivar-
iate response model. The chi-squared difference tests were carried out for each coefficient sepa-
rately. They test whether the difference in the coefficient of each variable across the two
responses equals zero. Thus, a statistically significant test of an independent variable means
Fig 4. The Variation of the Statistical Effect of Attendance at Religious Services on Moralistic Homonegativity (‘Homosexuality is never
justifiable’). In Textboxes: the p-value (<0.05) of countries which showed a statistically significant random coefficient; n.a.: question was not asked.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.g004
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that its coefficient differs significantly between the two response variables. The chi-squared
tests in Table 7 indicate that the differences in the size of the religion-coefficients between the
two forms of homonegativity are all statistically significant.
The last hypothesis refers to the national context.H8 hypothesized that living in countries
with high mean rates of attendance at religious services is positively related to moralistic homo-
negativity. Model M4 shows that country-level religiosity (the countries’mean rate of atten-
dance at religious services) is statistically positively related to both forms of homonegativity.
The higher a country’s average level of religiosity, the higher is the proportion of individuals
endorsing one or both homonegative attitudes among its population. The religious moral com-
munity in Europe may foster trust and good neighborliness [98,99], but according to the EVS-
data, at least on the country-level it is also strongly associated with intolerance toward homo-
sexual lifestyles and toward homosexuals. H8 is therefore confirmed by the data.
The coefficients of the country-level controls are as expected based on the literature: High
levels of perceived government corruption (CPI) and income inequality of countries are
strongly significantly positively related to both moralistic homonegativity and intolerance
toward homosexuals. A high degree of gay-rights implementation in a country, on the other
hand, is negatively related to its citizens’ likelihood of endorsing homonegative attitudes.
The country-level variances of the two response variables, as well as the correlation between
them decrease considerably and statistically significantly when the country-level variables are
included. FromM3 to M4 (Table 5) the between-country variance of ‘homosexuality is never
justifiable’ decreases from 1.521 to 0.425 and the between-country variance of ‘would not like
as neighbors: homosexuals decreases from 0.231 to 0.032. Thus, the countries’ levels of religios-
ity, corruption, income inequality and the degree of gay-rights implementation explain 72% of
the between-country variation of ‘homosexuality is never justifiable’ and 86% of the between-
country variation of ‘would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’. Thus, the contextual variables
capture the between-country differences both forms of homonegativity very well.
Table 7. Chi-Squared Difference Tests of the Joint Model Coefficients across the Two Response
Variables.
Independent Variable Wald Df.
Catholic 8.77* (2df)
Protestant 9.48* (2df)
Orthodox 18.30*** (2df)
Muslim 95.57*** (2df)
Church Attendance 274.66*** (2df)
Belief: Personal God 39.45*** (2df)
Belief: Spirit/Life Force 28.63*** (2df)
Belief: Fundamentalism 493.65*** (2df)
Country-Mean Church Attendance 20.85*** (2df)
Corruption (CPI) 34.95*** (2df)
Gini-Coefﬁcient 11.15** (2df)
Gay-rights implementation 12.25** (2df)
Note: The degrees of freedom are shown in parentheses.
* P<0.05
** P<0.01
*** P<0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133538.t007
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Discussion
The analysis of this paper tried to disentangle relationships between religious believing, belong-
ing and practice and two forms of homonegativity in Europe. The findings reveal interesting
patterns: Of the two forms of homonegativity, a moral rejection of homosexual practice has the
higher average endorsement-rates across countries, but also the greater cross- country varia-
tion. Both religious and non-religious Europeans are more reluctant to say they would not like
homosexuals as neighbors than to express a moral rejection of homosexual practice. The find-
ing makes sense. In contrast to a mere disagreement on sexual morals, a rejection of homosexu-
als as neighbors refers to them on a personal level and is therefore the stronger measure of
social distance.
As hypothesized in H1, we find that traditional doctrinal believing is statistically positively
related to moralistic homonegativity, but unrelated to intolerance toward homosexuals as a
group. The finding makes sense, as traditional doctrinal believers identify with the teachings of
their churches, which in the case of Europe’s majority denominations condemn homosexuality
as a sin, but at the same time encourage neighborliness and forgiveness. The finding confirms
that morally rejecting homosexual behavior and intolerance toward homosexuals as a group
are qualitatively different forms of homonegativity. This difference is clearly reflected in the
data. The notion that the religious teaching to ‘hate the sin, but to love the sinner’may prevent
traditional believers from rejecting homosexuals on a personal level is supported by our find-
ings. Those who endorse the fundamentalist truth-claim ‘there is only one true religion’, on the
other hand, are significantly more likely to express both moralistic homonegativity and intoler-
ance toward homosexuals as a group. The finding supports H3 and likely reflects a generally
more intolerant mindset of fundamentalists. It is plausible that people, who are not open to the
possibility that other religions may also have some valid truth to offer, are also less likely to tol-
erate divergent lifestyles, such as homosexuality. The exclusivity of the fundamentalist truth-
claim likely encourages feelings of social distance toward moral out-groups. As mentioned
above, the statement ‘would not like as neighbors: homosexuals’ is a measure of social distance
[100,101] is plausible that those, who seek to isolate themselves from diverging beliefs, tend to
also seek physical distance to those, whose lifestyles they disapprove of. Modern, individualized
belief in a Spirit/Life Force, on the other hand is strongly negatively related to both forms of
homonegativity. The findings hold for most of Europe except the post-soviet Eastern European
countries.
Table 6 showed that when allowing the slopes of believing to vary across countries their
main effects remain statistically significant across Europe as a whole. The findings thus confirm
H1, H2 and H3 for the majority of countries. They accord with modernization theory’s distinc-
tion between traditionalist and liberal attitudes [45,102] and tie in with a literature finding dif-
ferent images of God to be differently related to intolerance toward homosexuals [103–105].
However, the fact that religious believing matters more in Western, Northern and Southern
Europe while in most of the (less modernized) Eastern European countries it makes no statisti-
cally significant difference to people’s attitudes toward homosexuals also support approaches
that are critical of modernization theory. Hervieu-Legér [106], Emerson and Hartman [107],
and Clairmont and Browning [108] remind us that religious traditionalism and intolerant atti-
tudes can be cultural responses to modernization itself (not just a lack of it) and can thus have
significance within modernized settings.
Furthermore, the findings lend some support to theories of Pink-washing, and homonation-
alism [72,73,75]. The distinction between traditionalist, liberal-individualized religious believ-
ers and non-believers with regards to their attitudes toward homosexuals is greatest in
precisely the countries that are governed by what a recent literature described as a Western
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European homonationalist “Pink Agenda” [72,73] of policies defining the acceptance and legal
protection of homosexual identities as a condition of membership in a “free and tolerant
Europe” [72]. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, where homonegative discourses are highly
prevalent, propagated by political leaders and inscribed in the legislations of countries like Rus-
sia, Ukraine and Serbia religious believing has little statistical significance. Homonegativity in
Eastern Europe is not driven by traditionalist religious beliefs, but is a widely socially accepted
phenomenon, often seen as part of a nationalist resistance against values that are seen as for-
eign and imposed [76] by a “decadent West”. The results make clear that it is important not
just to look at the individual level, but to contextualize the findings. The between-country vari-
ation in the effects of religious believing is large and follows a clear post-communist-Eastern-
versus-the-rest-of-Europe—divide.
Looking at religious belonging, members of all denominations are more likely than people
with no religious affiliation to express both forms of homonegativity. This finding is surprising.
Given that the teachings of both Christianity and Islam encourage members to love their neigh-
bors and to forgive those considered sinners [27], one would expect denominational affiliation
to be related to moralistic homonegativity, but not intolerance toward homosexuals as a group.
Muslims in particular stand out as the most likely to morally condemn homosexual behavior.
Both Muslims and Orthodox are also more likely than members of the other denominations
and non-members to reject homosexuals as neighbors. We can thus summarize that H4 and
H5 are confirmed by the data, while H6 is not supported.
As was the case with religious believing, the strong variation between countries shows how
important it is to contextualize the results and to avoid hasty generalizations based solely on
individual coefficients. Denominational membership is highly clustered within countries. 84%
of the Orthodox and 80% of the Muslims in the sample live in Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe. Many countries in this region still suffer deficits in socio-economic modernization and
governance. However, the models controlled for modernization measures.
Other plausible contextual factors are the countries’ historical legacies [109]. The vast
majority of Eastern Europe and large parts of the South-East, have legacies of communist rule
and of ethnic and religious conflict. In Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, Albania, Armenia, Lat-
via [22], Lithuania and Turkey nationalist rhetoric by political and religious leaders [110–112]
is known to have been intertwined with homonegative discourses for decades. At the same
time, Orthodoxy and Islam have been defined by political elites as counter-identities vis-à-vis
“the West” and against local cultural out-groups. Thus, the higher likelihood of Muslims and
Orthodox of endorsing homonegative attitudes is likely due to the strong role of religious affili-
ation as a national identity marker in these countries. The interplay of collective group-identifi-
cation and out-group intolerance was described by social identity theory [15,113].
Identity theory claims that such contexts foster perceptions of group-threat and anti-out-
group attitudes [15,114]. To sum up, it is unlikely that there should be something intrinsic to
the teachings of Islam and Orthodoxy rendering their members more homonegative than
members of other monotheistic religions. The most likely drivers of the correlation found
between Orthodox and Muslim belonging and homonegativity are nationalism and the inter-
vention of political and religious elites preaching bigotry in several regions of Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe.
However, the import of such cultural contexts is difficult to operationalize with survey data.
It does not make analytical sense to include dummy indicators for these contexts into our
model, as these would include most of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, which is almost half
the sample. Such measures would therefore not discriminate sufficiently for a meaningful sta-
tistical analysis. Furthermore, we cannot operationalize the explanatory power of cultural dis-
courses and ideologies with the EVS-data, as we do not have appropriate measures in the
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survey. These are limitations of this paper. With regard to religious practice, we found that
attendance at religious services is positively related to both forms of homonegativity. This con-
tradicts H7, which hypothesized a positive relationship only with moralistic homonegativity.
The reasoning was that those who attend religious services are more exposed to teachings of
neighborly love and forgiveness, and thus less intolerant toward homosexuals, but this is not
supported by the data. On the other hand, the scriptures of Europe’s monotheistic religions
contain numerous counter-examples of intolerance. Religion has both the potential to promote
neighborliness and forgiveness and to foster bigotry. Religious leaders can choose to preach
one or the other. Whether involvement in church fosters tolerance or intolerance likely
depends on the context, on how religious leaders teach their religion and on peer-group
dynamics within religious communities.
Fig 4 showed that the statistical effect of religious attendance varies greatly between coun-
tries. As was the case with religious believing and belonging, we found a clear West-East-divide:
Attendance at religious services shows strongly significantly positive relationships with moral-
istic homonegativity in Western, Northern and Southern Europe, but not in the post-soviet
countries of Eastern Europe.
In summary, traditional individual-level religiosity is positively related to homonegativity in
most of Europe, except the post-soviet East, where homonegativity appears to be largely a secu-
lar phenomenon. The high levels of homonegativity in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, are
likely a response to homonegative and anti-Western discourses that prevail in many Eastern
European countries. These discourses are largely secular. The only religiosity dimension that
plays to these discourses seems to be religious belonging.
The last step of the analysis tested for the statistical effect of the countries’mean rates of
attendance at religious services, controlling for perceived corruption, gay-rights implementa-
tion and income inequality. The analysis showed that the countries’mean rate of attendance at
religious services is statistically significantly positively related to both forms of homonegativity.
The finding that people living in highly religious countries are more likely than people in
secular countries to morally reject homosexuality is no surprise. According to theory [60,63]
religious communities promote traditionalist (gender-) norms and values. Because people liv-
ing in religious contexts are more exposed to religious values in their daily lives than those liv-
ing in secular contexts, they are more likely to reject homosexuality as a sin. However, our
findings also show that in many of Europe’s most religious countries, intolerance toward
homosexuals as a group is prevalent too. Looking at Fig 4, we see that almost all of Europe’s
most religious countries are located in the South-East. As mentioned above, they all have his-
torical legacies of inter-group conflict, which are often tied to religious identities.
Such cultural legacies have likely contributed to a general tendency toward out-group intol-
erance, hence homonegativity is more prevalent. This interpretation is plausible and it also
concurs with the findings on religious belonging.
A deeper exploration of the influence of historical legacies, nationalism and homonegative
political discourses would enhance the knowledge base on homonegativity in Europe further,
but lies beyond the scope of this article.
The analysis showed that the three dimensions of religiosity are differently related to the
two forms of homonegativity and that the relationships depend on the context.
Religious, socio-economic and cultural national contexts matter for public attitudes toward
homosexuality and homosexuals: The populations of highly religious countries, post-soviet
countries and countries with high corruption-levels, high income inequality and low levels of
gay-rights implementation score significantly higher on both indicators of homonegativity.
Future studies monitoring these relationships across Europe should take the multidimensional-
ity of religion and the context-dependence of the relationships into account.
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Conclusion
The results of the analysis reveal that homonegativity is a problem in Europe. In a majority of
countries more than half of the population express homonegative attitudes.
However, the analysis showed that not all religiosity is related to both forms of homonega-
tivity. In the majority of European countries traditional believers, although likely to morally
reject homosexuality as a sin, are no more likely than non-traditional and non-believers to
resent homosexuals as neighbors. People living in Eastern- and South-Eastern European coun-
tries, Muslims and Orthodox’ are the most likely to morally reject homosexuality and to resent
homosexuals as neighbors. National contexts of high religiosity, high perceived corruption,
high inequality and shortcomings in the implementation of gay-rights are strongly linked to
homonegativity.
The findings of this article have important implications for European political and religious
leaders and policy makers. The findings show how important it is that political and religious
leaders carefully reflect what messages they send out in public, in order to avoid spreading
intolerance. Policies addressing corruption and income inequality across Europe are likely to
indirectly benefit public attitudes toward homosexuals. Policy makers in Europe need to fur-
ther Europe’s gay rights- agenda and at the same time avoid turning gay-rights policies into a
Western-European homonationalist agenda that may be perceived as excluding Europe’s East.
Supporting Eastern and South-Eastern European gay-rights activists and making their voices
heard locally, as well as on the European level is crucial. It will help make the European gay
rights agenda more inclusive, aid in combating homonegativity at the local level and thus pro-
mote social peace not only in Western Europe, but also in Europe’s East and South-East.
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